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Text of address before joint meeting of Los
Angeles Chapter, California Society of
Certified Public Accountants; Robert Morris
Associates; Los Angeles Bank Credit Men’s
Association—March 3,1969.

pring

is

here again,

and back in Con

S necticut where I live, tulips will soon

be coming up in the garden.
Sometimes when I see the green leaves
and the red or yellow flowers, I think of
the man who had a tulip worth $4,000.
This tulip wasn’t made of gold or plat
inum—it wasn’t a piece of jewelry at all.
It was a real, live tulip, growing in the
ground, and someone was willing to pay
—and did pay—the equivalent of $4,000
for the bulb from which it grew.
As you probably surmise, the transac
tion I refer to is not contemporary; it took
place in Holland in the 1630’s.
But that sale was not an isolated trans
action. On the contrary, there were thou
sands of sellers and thousands of buyers
exchanging tulip bulbs at fantastic prices.
There is a record of one sale that took
place not for cash but by a swap of goods,
and the purchaser paid for a single bulb:
4 oxen, 8 pigs, 12 sheep, 4 barrels of beer,
1,000 pounds of cheese, one complete bed,
and a suit of clothes.
The buying of tulip bulbs—not to plant
and enjoy the flowers but to sell to some
one else at a higher price—lasted for three
years. Then the fever passed. In a matter
of weeks, prices for bulbs fell to threequarters, a half, one-quarter their previous
quotations. Thousands of people were
bankrupted.
This classic example of speculation be
came known as tulipomania—look that up
in your Funk & Wagnall’s—and you will
find it listed there today. Tulipomania was
a manifestation of what we would now call
“commodity trading.” Another hundred

years had to pass before financial sophisti
cation reached a point where speculation
could take place with pieces of paper
standing as symbols for values less tangi
ble than a commodity.

In economic history, the first instances
of modern speculative finance were the
South Sea Company organized in England
in 1711 and the Occidental Company or
ganized in France in 1717. The basic idea
was similar in both cases. The companies
would assume a large part of the debt obli
gations of the respective governments in
return for certain monopoly privileges—
trade with South America and the Pacific
islands in the case of the English venture,
exploitation of natural resources in the
Mississippi Valley in the case of the
French venture.
Shares were offered to the public, and
the aura of romance surrounding the South
Seas and the New World made the stocks
real glamour issues. The prices rose gid
dily, with the result that the stock could
be used as collateral for bigger and bigger
borrowings. The promoters issued addi
tional shares, which were used to acquire
more properties. Within just a few years,
the price of South Seas stock rose 700 per
cent. People from all levels of society
scrambled to get aboard.
The only catch was that the underlying
assets were not worth what the stock was
selling for, nor could they be worth so
much in the foreseeable future.
The South Sea Bubble burst in England,
and the Mississippi Bubble in France, in
the same year—1720. A few lucky specula
tors who had taken their profits earlier
made fortunes. But thousands upon thou

sands of people lost everything they had.
The stock of the Bank of England itself
fell by half in four months. Many lesser
banks failed. There were government in
vestigations. Some people who feared in
vestigation or who could not meet their
debts fled abroad. Panic reigned.
That was long ago, and conditions
change. Thus, it was many years later
when one of the best known economists in
the United States could allay the worries
that a few people felt by declaring, “Stock
prices have reached what looks like a per
manently high plateau.”
The economist was Professor Irving
Fisher of Yale, and the time of this pro
nouncement was 1929. Nor was Professor
Fisher alone in his belief. It was shared
by other academic economists and by such
prestigious figures as John J. Raskob, who
had just resigned as chairman of the Fi
nance Committee of General Motors to
become chairman of the Democratic Na
tional Committee, and Charles Mitchell,
president of the National City Bank in
New York.
And why not? During 1928 the price of
Allied Chemical stock had gone from 154
to 250; Chrysler from 63 to 132; General
Electric from 136 to 221.
In relating these events, I cannot help
remembering that in a speech to the House
of Burgesses in colonial Virginia, Patrick
Henry said: “Caesar had his Brutus;
Charles the First his Cromwell; and
George the Third . . .”—whereupon there
were cries of “Treason” from his fellow
members—and he went on “. . . and
George the Third may profit from their
example. If this be treason, make the most
of it.”

Like Mr. Henry, I am not pushing any
parallels to conclusions. If persons in the
audience wish to do so, that is up to them.
My reason for recalling episodes of his
tory is that businessmen are generally so
engrossed in dealing with the affairs of
today and in planning for the future (as
indeed they should be) that they seldom
have time to think seriously about any
thing that happened prior to their own
business lifetimes. Yet, as George Santa
yana has noted, “Those who fail to under
stand the lessons of history are condemned
to repeat its errors.”
All of us today realize that in the past
few years the stock market—or at least
certain sectors of it—have been, shall we
say—exuberant. Whether the exuberance
is of such a degree as to imply a wide
spread danger, I am not enough of a
prophet to say. In recent weeks the market
has drifted downward but concern over
speculation remains. Just a few days ago
the new chairman of the SEC testified be
fore a Congressional committee about the
causes and results of speculative activity in
the market, and recently another SEC
commissioner spoke of “the undesirable
effects of the super-heated speculative
fever now existing in our markets.”
I would remind you that some new-issue
offerings of stock in franchised restau
rants, nursing homes, and so on—presum
ably priced by the underwriters at levels
regarded as reflecting fair values—have
risen two, four, or even eight times the
original price in a matter of months. Stocks
of some old-line companies, with millions
of shares outstanding, have leaped sharply
in reaction to take-over bids. It is difficult
to believe that a company which has had
a market valuation in the neighborhood,

say, of $400 million for the past year or so
is suddenly worth 50 per cent more.

ccurrences of this sort

should con

O cern all businessmen, since if exces

sive exuberance were to lead to excessive
reaction, it would be bad for all business.
And such occurrences concern certified
public accountants not only because of
their function of reviewing the financial
statements of companies whose shares are
traded but because, as professional men,
they have a public responsibility.
The accounting profession has taken
some positive actions to meet its responsi
bilities in this respect, and it is trying to
take more.
Let me make clear that CPAs are not
dogmatically against speculation. They
fully realize that, within reasonable
bounds, it plays an economically useful
role. CPAs realize, too, that the roots of
speculation lie in mankind’s age-old de
sire to get something for nothing, and they
have no hope or intention of trying to
change human nature.
At the same time, however, CPAs real
ize that speculation has undoubtedly been
stimulated by some corporate accounting
practices, and they want to keep specula
tive fever from being aggravated by inade
quate or potentially misleading corporate
financial data. They want such data to be
as reliable as possible and as revealing as
practicable. If large numbers of the public
do not read the information or, having
read it, choose not to heed it, that is their
decision.
To return for a moment to my reference
to the speculation in 17th Century Hol
land, if people want to pay ridiculous

prices for tulip bulbs, okay. But they
should have the means for knowing
whether they are buying tulip bulbs or
onions.
Today, the tulip bulbs are convertible
preferred stocks, convertible debentures—
and the latest darling, warrants—which
some business journalists have called
“funny money.” And the investor would
be well advised to tip-toe carefully through
these tulips or he may end up in the onion
patch. All of this is part of the current
emphasis on “performance” and the crea
tion of “instant earnings.”

THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED

public accountants is in the forefront
of those trying to establish fair standards
of corporate reporting in the face of the
ingenious kinds of securities, and pack
ages of securities, conceived by imagina
tive financiers. The Institute’s efforts in
this direction take the form largely of
Opinions of its Accounting Principles
Board. The efforts have had the general
support of the SEC, the stock exchanges,
and a good many bankers and business
men. They have also encountered business
opposition.
Probably everyone in an audience such
as this is familiar with the several Opin
ions which the Accounting Principles
Board has issued in the past couple of
years or which it has proposed and cir
culated to the business community for
comment. But let me tell you briefly about
one problem area of special significance.
As we all know, the one figure in a com
pany’s annual report which the average
stock-buyer pays more attention to than
any other is the company’s earnings per

share. This is the figure that is reported
prominently in the newspapers; and, of
course, it is a figure that not only amateur
investors but the sophisticated ones also
take into account.
So it’s important to note that the recent
pronouncements made or proposed by the
Accounting Principles Board bear on the
earnings-per-share figure one way or an
other.
Two years ago last January the Board
issued Opinion 9, which did several things.
For one, it said that extraordinary gains or
losses should be included in a company’s
reported net income. Previously, as you
know, a company might add a nonrecur
ring gain to, or deduct a nonrecurring loss
from, its net income figure, depending on
whether management felt it desirable to
raise or lower the figure. Conversely, if
management did not want the gain or loss
to affect the reported net, it could credit
or charge the amount to retained earnings,
which would not show in the income state
ment but in the analysis of retained earn
ings. It was more common to see an ex
traordinary gain in net income and the
extraordinary loss in retained earnings.
Obviously, this option could hamper com
parison of a company’s earnings from one
year to another, or comparison as between
two different companies. That option has
now been closed.
Opinion 9 did something else. Custo
marily, a company’s formal financial state
ments have shown net income as a total
figure—the earnings per share figure has
been somewhere else in the report to stock
holders, probably in the President’s Letter
and the “Highlights of the Year,” which
are in the opening pages.
An auditor renders his opinion only on

the formal financial statements—not on
the President’s Letter or any other part of
an annual report. Opinion 9 “strongly
Recommended” that the per-share figure be
on the face of the financial statements. Al
though this was only a recommendation,
many companies promptly adopted the
practice, and it is now contemplated to
make inclusion of the per-share figure ne
cessary if an auditor is to give a so-called
“clean” opinion on a company’s financial
statements.
Further, Opinion 9 recommended that
reports for companies having potential
dilution in earnings applicable to common
stock should carry two earnings-per-share
figures that is, a so-called primary earn
ings per share, and also a fully diluted
figure to show what the earnings would be
if all convertible securities and other con
tingent issues were to be exchanged for
common stock.
Still further, it said that the number of
common shares used as the divisor in com
puting the primary figure should include
the number of shares which could be de
manded by holders of convertible securi
ties which derive a substantial part of their
value from their convertibility. These
were termed residual securities in recogni
tion of their substantial equivalence to
common stock.
In a nutshell, the primary earningsper-share figure would be based on the
number of common shares outstanding
plus the number of shares assignable to
convertible securities having “common
stock equivalency”; and the fully diluted
figure would be based on the outstanding
common plus all convertible securities,
whether or not they met the criteria of
“common stock equivalency.”

Opinion 9 came at an opportune time,
for a wave of complicated securities was
rising, often in connection with mergers
and acquisitions. Some securities were so
imaginatively conceived that earnings per
share computed by the traditional method
could be enhanced simply by issuance of
the security. For example, common stock
holders might be offered in exchange for
their shares a so-called convertible pre
ferred stock paying no dividend but carry
ing the right to convert back into common
stock at a rate increasing over the years.
Although the value of the preferred would
depend entirely on its substantial equiva
lence to common stock, earnings per share
computed by the usual method would be
increased because of the reduced number
of common shares outstanding. This was
a situation the Board felt required
correcting.
Opinion 9 did that, but experience with
it has revealed a need to expand and clar
ify the meaning of residual securities. The
Board is now doing that.

T AST NOVEMBER THE BOARD EXPOSED an

other proposed Opinion on earnings
per share, one that is drawing heavy oppo
sition from some corporate managements.
With the exposure period over and com
ments received, the APB will consider
further action on this matter.
Whereas virtually everyone is agreed
that some convertible securities have so
many of the market attributes of common
stock that they ought logically to be in
cluded with common in computing earn
ings per share, the criteria for determining
common stock equivalency can be framed
in different ways. The problem lies in how

and where to draw the line between gim
micky securities which might give rise to
misleading reporting and solid senior se
curities with reasonable added attractions.
A lot of deep thinking and debate are tak
ing place on the subject.
Very likely the Accounting Principles
Board will arrive at the conclusion that a
convertible security—either debenture or
preferred stock—will be considered as the
equivalent of common stock when its
terms are substantially equivalent to those
of the common stock, or when its yield at
the time of its issuance is such as to pre
clude its classification as a senior security.
Thus, if the cash yield of a convertible se
curity is far below the prevailing rate for
non-convertible long-term debt or non
convertible preferred stock of the same
corporation, the security would be con
sidered as a common stock equivalent.
Further establishment of a minimum
rate of demarcation for common stock
equivalency would go far toward clarifying
the general principle laid down in Opinion
9. But even without this needed clarifica
tion, Opinion 9 has served to effectively
limit the ability of imaginative financiers
to use convertible securities to aid in re
porting “instant earnings.” Recently, The
New York Times said that John M. Hart
well, president of the Hartwell & Camp
bell Fund, in connection with his fund
“pronounced the benediction on the con
glomerates which he said were hurt when
the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants changed the rules to require
conglomerates to report their earnings on
a fully diluted basis.”
The attention given in Opinion 9 to
convertible securities, and the lack of
attention to warrants, have fostered a

marked increase in the use of warrants to
accomplish instant performance. This pre
sents a new challenge to the Board, and
it is about to respond by pronouncing that
warrants—and options and rights as well
—should be regarded as common stock
equivalents at all times until they are exer
cised or expire. Where warrants are out
standing, earnings per share (primary and
fully diluted) should be computed by add
ing to the common shares outstanding the
number of common shares issuable upon
exercise of the warrants, less the number
of common shares that could be purchased
with the proceeds from the exercise of all
warrants.
The objective here is not to stop the
issuance of warrants but to stop the
reporting of earnings per share without
giving appropriate recognition to the
heavy impact of potential dilution.
But this is only a part of the story of the
warrant, a truly wondrous security—if it
can be called that—because of its leverage
and speculative advantages.
Some companies have issued warrants
to present stockholders in exchange for
nothing. The New York Stock Exchange,
with the agreement of the accounting pro
fession, has made this ploy less appealing
by requiring the warrants to be accounted
for as if they were stock dividends. That
is, retained earnings must be capitalized
in the amount of the fair market value of
the warrants. Since this requirement has
been made known, some companies have
withdrawn proposals to issue warrants.
Incidentally, the Exchange has a policy of
refusing to list long-term warrants because
of the problems they have historically
created.

Warrants also have been issued in con
nection with takeovers of other companies,
and issuing companies have tried to apply
pooling of interests accounting to the
transactions. The accounting profession
has prohibited this practice by a less for
mal means than an Accounting Principles
Board Opinion.
All these actions and proposals have
come about, not because accountants like
to make life more complicated than it is
already, but because businessmen them
selves have devised complicated ways to
acquire and finance companies. CPAs do
not take a stand as to whether acquisitions
and conglomerations are good, bad, or
indifferent from a standpoint of economic
or social principle. But they have been
confronted with tough problems of how
to handle these matters in financial state
ments in a way that will be fair to the
investing public.

The accounting profession feels these
problems have to be dealt with because
financing has come to involve such a large
number of warrants and convertible issues
(including some with conversion rates
which change at different periods of time)
that the customary way of computing
earnings per share is no longer adequate.
Some financing arrangements have been so
structured, in fact, as to result in what
might be called “ersatz earnings.”
Convertible securities have been issued
particularly to form conglomerate com
panies, a phenomenon which is drawing
increasing attention from Congress and
the SEC. No less than six Congressional
committees are investigating conglomer
ates this year and competition for star wit

nesses is likely to grow intense. Also the
popular press has found conglomerates to
be newsworthy; a recent cover story in
Time magazine dealt with the subject.
In attempting to shed light on conglom
erate companies, the American Institute
of CPAs proposed in September, 1967 that
highly diversified companies undertake an
experimental reporting of revenues and
earnings by broad industry segments as a
means of helping investors appraise corpo
rate operations. Last fall the SEC pro
posed regulations that would require
product-line reporting in registration
statements related to new filings, and at
that time the Institute agreed with the ob
jective but not with some of the details for
implementation.
A few weeks ago the Commission an
nounced a revised proposal, which gives
effect to most of the suggestions made by
the Institute. The Institute now endorses
this proposal, except for one feature which
appears to be ambiguous and potentially
incapable of being implemented. The Ac
counting Principles Board is now consider
ing the need for an Opinion dealing with
product-line figures in financial state
ments reported on by CPAs.
The conglomerate movement has led
the profession to take a new look also at
the pooling concept. In the fall of 1968, the
Institute released a research study in
which the authors took the position that,
except in certain specified and relatively
infrequent circumstances, all acquisitions
should be treated as purchases. Not every
one within the accounting profession or
outside it agrees with this, and the subject
is under continuing study.
Nearly everyone agrees, however, that
some tightening of accounting rules is

needed in this area, even though there is
a wide diversity of views. At one extreme,
some would add mild restraints but essen
tially preserve the status quo. At another
extreme, some favor abandoning pooling
entirely, and requiring the capitalization
of goodwill and subsequent amortization
by systematic charges to income.
Many contend that pooling-of-interests
accounting fails to provide a fair account
ing for the cost of an acquired company.
By carrying forward old historical
amounts from the books of the acquired
company, the combined enterprise avoids
the capitalization and subsequent charge
to income of high acquisition costs in terms
of cash and securities. If poolings were
outlawed and purchase accounting re
quired, with amortization of all costs in
cluding goodwill, the merger movement
would be significantly curtailed. Many if
not most acquisitions could not be justi
fied in terms of future flow of income if
earnings had to be charged for the full
costs involved.
As matters now stand, however, the tax
laws and accounting concepts, taken in
conjunction, present a situation in which
Company A, whose stock has a high price
earnings ratio in the market, can issue
new shares in exchange for the stock of
Company B, which sells at a lower P/E;
and Company A’s stock will instantly
show higher earnings per share even
though the actual dollar-amount of earn
ings by the combined companies is un
changed. Isn’t this the kind of mirage
value that attached to the tulip bulbs?
With pooling accounting, an acquiring
company can sell investments or other
assets which are undervalued on the books
of the acquired company and report in

stant earnings of sizable amounts. With
this kind of earnings magic possible, it is
no wonder that soundly-managed, con
servatively-financed companies of all sizes
have become targets for takeovers. Even
some of our very largest banks have been
sought by relatively small conglomerates.

nd this same phenomenon

has

A prompted a predictable defensive

course of action for managements of tar
get companies who look over their
shoulders and see some one gaining on
them. One defensive tactic is to revalue
assets upwards to the extent possible with
in the range of generally accepted account
ing principles. In 1968, there were more
voluntary changes from one acceptable
accounting method to another than in any
year in recent history. All such changes
that have come to my attention have been
from a conservative method to a liberal
method—from accelerated depreciation to
straight line, from deferral of investment
credit to flow-through, from expensing of
research and development to capitaliza
tion, from lifo inventory valuation to fifo.
These changes all have the effect of report
ing higher asset values and higher current
income.
That these alternatives exist is a huge
problem area for the Accounting Princi
ples Board, which is dedicated to narrow
ing the range of acceptable accounting
methods. But with the complexity of the
many specific problems, alternatives in
some accounting areas are going to con
tinue unless and until criteria can be es
tablished for determining when specific
methods should be used.

In the accounting profession's drive
for improved corporate financial re
porting, the banking community has been
for the most part a staunch ally. Bankers
have offered much encouragement and co
operation to the Accounting Principles
Board in its efforts, and occasionally bank
ers have been among the sharpest critics of
accounting, followed by business in gen
eral. But these same attitudes have not
always prevailed when it comes to ac
counting and reporting for banks
Of particular interest to banking groups
are the discussions which representatives
of the accounting profession have been
having lately with representatives of the
banking business and of the regulatory
authorities. As you know, the reports of
banks to their stockholders, with a few
prominent exceptions, speak of Net Oper
ating Earnings the way other businesses
speak of Net Income. For example, if the
President’s Letter to the Stockholders re
fers to a new record in “earnings”, Net
Operating Earnings is what is meant. If
an earnings-per-share figure is shown on
the face of the income statement, it is
based on Net Operating Earnings.
Banks do not present a figure for “net
income.” But net operating earnings do
not reflect provision for loan losses or
gains and losses on sales of securities.
Bank income statements follow a format
required for reporting to regulatory agen
cies, who are concerned mainly with sol
vency and protection of depositors. But
even for this purpose, no one can justify
the omission of a loan loss provision from
net operating earnings. A preferential in
come tax treatment complicates computa
tion of reasonable provision for loan losses,
but it does not make it impossible. Loan

losses are operating expenses of banks,
just as they are operating expenses of all
businesses that grant credit. Thus, the
operating results of an entire industry are
overstated. Investors in bank stocks need
a fair presentation of income and the Ac
counting Principles Board is trying to fill
that need—in the face of considerable
opposition. It is not far-fetched to say that
the way banks now report to their stock
holders could be the basis for a conundrum
like this—Question: “When is a loss not a
loss?” Answer: “When it happens to a
bank.”
Both the bankers and the CPAs are in
quite close agreement conceptually, how
ever, and although there are details of ap
plication to be worked out, I believe this
can be done and that the reporting by
banks to their stockholders will soon be
more in accord with that of the business
world generally. This development is the
more important because of an apparently
growing interest in bank stocks among
investors.

MY COMMENTS HAVE BEEN FOCUSED ON

problems of financial reporting and
efforts of the APB to deal with these prob
lems. This is only one aspect of the pro
gram of the American Institute to improve
financial reporting and the professional
standards of performance of its members.
These efforts and the self-regulation of
stock exchanges and other institutions in
the financial community are essential if
the free enterprise system is to continue as
we know it.
History shows that the free enterprise
system can fall into disfavor as a result
of lack of foresight, self-discipline and re

sponsibility. Such episodes are unfortu
nate not only because the system is the
most efficient for producing goods and
providing services but because it is the
one most consistent with individual free
dom. The price of maintaining the system
is constant vigilance against excesses and
laxity. Every one of us who plays a respon
sible role in it must do his part.

ADDENDUM

A few days after Mr. Savoie’s address,
the Institute’s Accounting Principles
Board approved two new Opinions and
reached general agreement on a third.

. .. Commercial banks must now report
a net income figure, including provi
sions for loan losses and results of se
curity transactions.

. . . No accounting recognition is to be
given to the conversion feature of con
vertible debt, because of the insepara
bility of the debt and equity features. A
value should be attributed to detach
able warrants, however, determined at
or shortly after time of issuance.

. . . Substantial agreement was reached
on an Opinion dealing with earnings
per share; in particular that earnings
per share figures should appear on the
face of the income statement and that
the determination of the common stock
equivalency of a convertible security
should be made only at time of issu
ance.
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